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5 U.S. law has never prohibited dual citizenship. Still, even
as “a sense of hard, exclusive loyalty to the state began to
dissipate” at the Cold War’s close, legal scholar Peter Spiro
writes,  the  “intense historical  opprobrium trained on the
status”  has  been  “as  much  cultural  as  legal,”  and  there
remains  on  a  popular  understanding  that  it  is  somehow
illegal (69). Spiro’s book explains why a recent “explosion
in  the  number  of  dual  citizens  has  provoked  so  little
controversy in the United States,” how “barriers are falling
elsewhere  as  well,”  and  argues  that  dual  citizenship  is
“good for America” (86). It traces the pitfalls and workings
of  dual  nationality  through historical  individual  cases  (of
which his own is a recent example) from the mid-nineteenth
century through the First and Second World Wars, the Cold
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War, and the contemporary. What’s revealed is a slow move
from executive  branch  decisions,  to  case-by-case  judicial
decisions, to congressional moves, back to federal judiciary
decisions, and finally toward regulation by international
tribunals. 
6 While  Spiro’s  work  might  have  more  thoroughly
illuminated how such situations existed before his starting
date  of  1867,  what’s  clear  is  that  from  the  nineteenth
century  on,  legal  consideration  of  dual  citizenship  most
often  arose  during  international  disagreements  over
military  service  obligations,  particularly  in  times  of  war.
This limited citizenship issues to male citizens, for whom
dual citizenship was sometimes compared to polygamy or
bigamy, was seen as an offense to nature. 
7 In  Europe  before  the  French  revolution,  notions  of
“perpetual allegiance” to a sovereign were the norm. It was
precisely this “feudal” notion of perpetual allegiance that
generated the first dual nationals: those born in one land,
then migrating to take citizenship in another. U.S. conflicts
began as British ships began seizing American citizens at
sea,  pressing  them  into  military  service  during  the
Napoleonic  wars,  as  the  Crown  considered  them  British
subjects by birth. Other complications arose as naturalized
Euro-American citizens returned to the lands of their birth,
where they might  be pressed into  military  service  there.
Early  on,  such  cases  were  dealt  with  through  the U.S.
Secretary of State. As one of the only nations in the world
to  consider  anyone born within  its  borders  an automatic
citizen,  regardless  of  parentage,  the  United  States  often
had  difficulties  in  making  its  cases  even  for  second-
generation  citizens  traveling  to  Europe.  There  were  also
concerns that U.S. citizens might return to the lands of their
birth to take up arms against the United States in wartime,
and  that  U.S.  citizens  convicted  of  crimes  in  the  United
States  might  flee  to  their  birth  nations  to  escape  court
decisions and avoid punishment. 
8 Because it was a land of immigrant-citizens, the United
States was a leader in negotiating such problems. Not until
1870  did  Britain  recognize  the  right  of  its  citizens  to
expatriate (to reject their citizenship in favor of another).
Other  nations  moved  more  slowly,  and  harmonization  of
international  law  remains  incomplete.  Questions  of  what
jurisdiction the U.S. had over its citizens outside the U.S.–or
what right it  had to intervene on their  behalf  when they
found themselves abroad–remained murky throughout the
nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries.  Spiro’s  work  (with
copious  citations)  illuminates  some  of  the  machinations
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laying the groundwork for notions of citizenship playing out
over  the  next  century, as,  the  U.S.  State  Department
suggested  in  1910,  “vast  improvements  in  facilities  for
communication and transportation” and trade aligned with
contributions foreign residence of U.S. citizens might make
to “the wealth and strength, the prestige and the general
welfare” of  the United States.  The status of  U.S.  citizens
residing abroad remained ambiguous, however, left to such
factors as their “mode” of child-raising, “general conduct,”
and participation in the politics of the country of foreign
residence. While voting in foreign elections did not cause
U.S.  citizens  to  lose  U.S.  citizenship,  use  of  a  foreign
passport could incur at least temporary loss of the right “to
recognition and protection” as a citizen of the United States
(30).  
9 Spiro  outlines  two  models  of  citizenship  in  conflict
during the nineteenth century (and still in play): that of jus
soli (based on where one was born) and of jus sanguinis
(parentage). Their interplay was to ground issues of dual
citizenship  into  our  own  era.  Because  the  United  States
considered almost anyone born within its borders to be a
U.S. citizen, while most European nations based citizenship
on that of a child’s parents,  by 1920, Spiro writes,  some
half of all Americans may have held dual nationality, even if
many were unaware of the fact (31). Complications arose
again  as  eager  U.S.  men enrolled in  Canadian or  British
forces to fight the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-
Hungary before the U.S. itself had entered the First World
War  (their  U.S.  citizenship  had  later  to  be  restored  by
special legislation).   
10
Marriage  was  another  early  area  of  complication.
Nineteenth-century  law  left  women  citizens  of  their
husbands’  country  on  marrying,  while  termination  of  the
marriage returned them to their original citizenship status.
Spiro recounts the case of San Francisco suffragette Ethel
Mackenzie. California had recognized women’s right to vote
in 1911, but when Mackenzie registered to vote, she was
rejected for having married a British citizen. Her case and
others sparked a fight for legislation achieved in 1922, the
Marital  Women’s  Independent  Citizenship  Act,  effectively
disjoining women’s citizenship from that  of  their  spouses
(though for  American women living with  foreign spouses
abroad, this right wasn’t recognized for another decade).
Spiro builds his case for dual citizenship as a human right
from such movements toward gender equality. 
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A  darker  period  (for  Spiro’s  argument)  followed  the
U.S.’s  1940  Nationality  Act,  a  move  to  revoke  the  U.S.
citizenship  of  those  enlisting  with  foreign  forces,  taking
foreign citizenship or voting in foreign elections.  The act
had some grounds,  as Spiro outlines:  “The Hitler  regime
had paid expenses for several hundred German immigrants
to  the  United  States,  many  of  them  naturalized  U.S.
citizens,  to  travel  home  to  cast  ballots”  in  Germany’s
referendum to annex the Saar (43). This was followed by a
congressional  act  of  1952,  under  which  any  evidence  of
“political  identification  with  another  state  triggered
expatriation” (40). This, Spiro suggests, was unnecessary:
logically,  he  writes,  Americans  engaged  in  international
espionage would be those least likely to “maintain outward
evidence of attachment to adversary states” (41). 
12
1967  was  another  legislative  benchmark,  as  the  U.S.
Supreme Court examined the case of Polish-born artist Beys
Afroyim, who moved to Israel in 1949, then attempted to
repatriate  to  the  United  States  in  1960,  after  having
apparently  entered  an  Israeli  polling  station  to  make
illustrations. The Court denied the U.S. Congress powers to
“take  away  an  American  citizen’s  citizenship  without  his
assent”  (56).  The  decision  was  a  turning  point.  Still,  as
Spiro points out, the U.S. State Department was, into the
late 1980s, initiating an average annual 4,500 potential loss
of  U.S.  citizenship  cases  per  year  (if  only  600  of  these
resulted  in  involuntary  loss  of  citizenship).  In  1990,  the
State Department waived requirements for U.S. citizens to
declare  their  intent  to  retain  their  citizenship  before
declaring allegiance to foreign states, serving in the armed
services of foreign states not engaged in hostilities with the
United  States,  or  accepting  non-policy  level  employment
with foreign governments. 
13
Other countries had been moving in the same direction.
The UK dropped restrictions on dual nationality in 1948.
France did so in 1973, Canada in 1976 and Mexico in 1998,
when  some  200,000  Mexican-born  U.S.  citizens  were
retroactively  conferred  Mexican  citizenship  (1.5  million
have  followed  since  then,  Spiro  writes,  “without  much
notice,  on Capitol  Hill  or  elsewhere” [73]).  Italy,  Ireland,
Israel,  Turkey,  the  Philippines,  South  Korea  and  several
Central  American  nations  followed  suit  throughout  the
1990s and early 2000s. 
Peter J. Spiro, At Home in Two Countries: The Past and Future of Dual Citizen...
European journal of American studies , Reviews 2017-1
4
14 One result is a wave of U.S. citizens assuming political
offices in foreign governments in recent years: as foreign
ministers of Armenia and Bosnia, as the chief of Estonia’s
army,  of  Ukraine’s  finance  ministry,  as  Somalia’s  prime
minister and the UK’s under-secretary of state for internet
safety and security. Spiro concludes his chapter on “Turning
the  Corner  on  Dual  Citizenship”  with  acknowledgement
that conflicts between jus soli and jus sanguinis are issues
that will not disappear any time soon without international
intervention.  Children  born  in  the  U.S.,  whether  of
immigrant  parents,  or  of  visiting  students  on  temporary
visas, often have dual nationality (they range in the lower
millions). The same situation attends children born of the
some seven  million  U.S.  citizens  residing  abroad.  The
situation is more complex for such children whose parents
have dual nationality themselves, who may end up with four
legal passports from different nations. 
15
It’s in looking to the future, with passionate arguments
for  dual  citizenship’s  general  benefits,  that  Spiro’s  logic
turns  oddly  circular.  A  nation’s  integration  of  new
immigrants,  he  suggests,  will  not  be  hindered  by  their
retaining their original citizenship status along with their
new  citizenship.  Disallowing  their  naturalization  if  they
retain their original citizenship risks weakening their sense
of belonging in their new homes. Little empirical support is
given to either claim. “Maintaining ties to the country of
origin has always been seen to enrich the community as a
whole,” Spiro suggests, while new U.S. citizens “inculcated
with American constitutional values” may also take those
values back to their original countries to put them to work
there.  Allowing  dual  citizenship,  he  imagines,  thus  helps
“enlarge  global  democracy”  (85).  Of  course,  detractors
might  argue  just  the  opposite  scenario  might play  out
simultaneously:  allowing  dual  citizenship  for  immigrants
from less democratically-oriented nations may help spread
those  values  in  their  newly-adopted  countries.  Spiro’s
stronger argument is that “A dual Mexican and American
who advocates policies that benefit Mexico is little different
from a  Catholic  who  advocates  policies  endorsed  by  the
Church or a member of Amnesty International who writes
his  congressman  at  the  organization’s  behest”  (85-86).
Citizenship,  he  suggests,  is  “akin  to  membership  in
religions,  clubs,  non-governmental  organizations  and
political parties” (116). 
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Spiro’s  book  opens  with  the  quirky  disclaimer  that  a
main reason he, a U.S. citizen and son of a German-Jewish
refugee,  recently  applied  for  German  citizenship,  was  to
receive discounted admission to European museums (along
with a “vague sense” his children might benefit from access
to EU graduate schools and work visas). And he admits dual
citizenship  results  in  inequality.  For  some  of  those  with
multiple passports, each “will have some meaning for the
holder,  like  pictures  on  a  family  tree.”  For  others,
“passports  will  be  more  like  credit  cards,  each  offering
different  interest  rates  or  rewards  programs”  (150).  He
mentions the Argentines with Spanish or Italian ancestry
who escaped grinding inflation and sinking incomes in the
early years of our millennium because they were eligible to
flee to better jobs in Europe. In this case, Spiro concedes,
“mono-nationality without the EU tie comprised a kind of
second-class citizenship” based on ethnicity or what might
even be considered racial  lines  (148).  Examples  of  other
pitfalls  include Russia’s extension of  citizenship to ethnic
Russians in Georgia and Ukraine as an intentional means of
encroachment  into  sovereign  neighboring  territories.  In
such  cases,  it’s  hard  to  see  how,  as  Spiro  insists,  dual
nationality  “no  longer  implicates  the  kind  of  ideological
conflicts  that  it  did  in  a  world  of  more  diverse  political
systems” (81). 
17
What  Spiro’s  book neglects  to  touch on are  the  more
serious problems faced by those on our planet born or made
stateless, with no citizenship at all. After all, he suggests,
the question of how many passports one has and which are
most valuable is mostly “a rich kid’s problem.” Whatever its
benefits  to  societies  or  individuals,  however  much  we
should laud its toleration, Spiro concedes, dual citizenship,
past,  present  and perhaps  future,  is  finally  just  “another
way in which transnational elites are privileged relative to
their mono-national counterparts” (149). 
18
In terms of voting rights for overseas citizens and dual
citizens, Spiro outlines two models.  In places like France
and Columbia, overseas citizens have a constitutional right
not only to vote, but to separate representation in the upper
chambers of national legislatures. The Tunisian parliament
reserves  ten  seats  for  citizens  residing  in  France,  while
Switzerland has seen a proposal to create a twenty-seventh
canton  to  represent  its  citizens  living  abroad  (96).  U.S.
citizens living abroad, meanwhile, vote the ballot of their
most  recent  state  of  residence.   Overseas  voters,  as  a
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general  rule,  show much lower turnout  than their  home-
bound compatriots.  
19
Some  statistics  Spiro  lists  (and  there  are  many)  may
surprise:  some  seven  percent  of  the  Dutch  hold  dual
citizenship,  while  the  number  of  nations  terminating
citizenship  upon  naturalization  in  another  country  has
dropped from fifty-five to thirty percent since 1960. Even in
places  where  it  is  less  prevalent,  dual  citizenship  is
“undermining  state-based  identities,  reflecting  and
accelerating a postnational world” (131). Spiro sees this as
positive, even if it implies a “loss of filial intensity” within
national  borders  (135).  National  citizenship,  he  writes,
remains  “an  edifice  on  the  global  landscape”  even  as
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